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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 13-3955 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SERGEY SOROKIN, 
Appellant 
_______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-11-cr-00301-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 13, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO and BARRY, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,
1
 Judge. 
 
(Filed: June 20, 2014) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
RESTANI, Judge 
Appellant Sergey Sorokin challenges the district court’s calculation of his sentence 
following his conviction for bank fraud and wire fraud.  For the following reasons, we 
                                                                 
1
 The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, 
sitting by designation. 
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will affirm. 
I. 
 Appellant Sergey Sorokin and his co-defendant at trial Ramil Kismat (together, 
“the defendants”) were convicted of bank fraud and wire fraud.
2
  On several occasions 
between the middle of June and the end of October 2010, the defendants traveled from 
the New York/New Jersey area to central Pennsylvania to obtain items of value at various 
retailers by using compromised credit card and debit card accounts.  During these trips, 
the defendants would enter a retail establishment, engage in several transactions, often 
switching registers and cards, and then move on to another nearby store where they 
would engage in similar activity.  At sentencing the district court applied a fourteen-level 
enhancement to the base offense level based upon a finding that the intended loss of  the 
fraudulent scheme was $432,118.29.  This intended loss figure equaled the aggregate 
credit limit of each compromised account used in the scheme.  The amount the 
defendants obtained before apprehension was only $25,941.97. 
 Sorokin challenges his sentence on two grounds.  First, Sorokin argues that the 
district court erred in holding him responsible for fraudulent acts that took place on 
several dates in August and September 2010 because the government failed to prove that 
he personally participated in the fraudulent activity on those dates.  Second, Sorokin 
argues that the evidence does not support the district court’s finding that the defendants 
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 Kismat’s appeal is docketed as case number 13-4779. 
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intended to charge up to the maximum credit limit on each account.  We will address 
each argument in turn.
3
 
II. 
We exercise plenary review over the interpretation and application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2000).  
“[W]here the District Court’s application is based on factual conclusions, we will reverse 
only if its conclusion is clearly erroneous.”  Id. 
III. 
Sorokin argues that fraudulent activity on certain dates in August and September 
2010 involved either Kismat alone or Kismat and an unidentified third person.  Sorokin 
notes that neither he nor Kismat were charged as co-conspirators and contends that there 
was no proof that he and Kismat exchanged cards, co-mingled funds, or were involved 
jointly in the encryption of stolen credit and debit card information.  
When multiple people engage in criminal activity, a defendant may be held 
responsible, for sentencing purposes, for the loss caused by the acts or omissions of 
another if the government establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or 
omissions were: “(1) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity; (2) within the 
scope of the defendant’s agreement; and (3) reasonably foreseeable in connection with 
the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake.”  United States v. Duliga, 204 
F.3d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2000).  “In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the 
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 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over Sorokin’s sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
4 
 
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake . . . , the court may consider any explicit 
agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and 
others.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.2 (2013); see also United States v. Robinson, 603 F.3d 230, 
234 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding defendant responsible for actions of confederate in stolen 
check scheme when defendant had engaged in fraudulent activity with co-conspirator on 
two occasions); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.2(c)(2) (providing the following illustrative example: 
“Defendants F and G, working together, design and execute a scheme to sell fraudulent 
stocks by telephone. . . .  Each defendant is accountable for the amount obtained by his 
accomplice . . . because the conduct of each was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken 
criminal activity and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal 
activity.”).  A defendant can be responsible for the acts of others even if no conspiracy is 
charged.  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 
The district court found that Sorokin and Kismat agreed to undertake a scheme 
stretching from June through October of 2010 involving the use of stolen credit and debit 
card information to obtain items of value, and that the entirety of Kismat’s fraudulent 
activity was pursuant to that scheme.  We cannot say that this conclusion was clearly 
erroneous.  Sorokin accompanied Kismat on at least eight days over a five-month period 
to engage in fraudulent transactions.  The large number of accounts used, the fact that the 
accounts used on any particular day tended to come from the same financial institution or  
institutions, and the consistency of the modus operandi suggest that this was a 
coordinated and ongoing scheme involving Kismat and Sorokin.  The district court 
additionally was warranted in holding Sorokin responsible for the fraudulent activities of 
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anyone accompanying Kismat.  Sorokin reasonably could foresee that Kismat would 
bring another person to assist him in the fraudulent s hopping sprees because Sorokin 
himself accompanied and assisted Kismat on several of these trips. 
 We thus conclude that the district court did not clearly err in holding Sorokin 
responsible for the fraud that occurred on the dates contested by Sorokin.  
IV. 
 Sorokin also argues that the district court’s intended loss finding of $432,118.29 is 
unsupported by the evidence.  Sorokin lists numerous points to support this contention, 
including the fact that the actual loss of $25,941.97 was a fraction of that amount, neither 
defendant admitted to intending to use the cards up to their limits, and the defendants did 
not use every card until it was declined. 
The loss to be used for sentencing purposes shall be “the greater of actual loss  or 
intended loss.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 n.3(A).  “Intended loss” is defined as (I) “the pecuniary 
harm that was intended to result from the offense; and (II) includes intended pecuniary 
harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.”  Id. § 2B1.1 n.3(A)(ii).  A 
district court errs by simply equating the intended loss of a credit card fraud scheme with 
the credit cards’ aggregate credit limit without “‘deeper analysis.’”  United States v. 
Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 
186, 192 (3d Cir. 2000)).  The facts of the case must support an intended loss finding that 
equals the aggregate credit limit.  Id.  Even though a criminal might not expect to succeed 
in causing the entirety of the potential loss (here, the aggregate credit l imit), “expectation 
is not synonymous with intent when a criminal does not know what he may expect to 
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obtain, but intends to take what he can.”  Geevers, 226 F.3d at 193.  A failure to cause the 
entirety of the potential loss because of third-party intervention or the defendant’s desire 
to avoid detection does not prevent a finding that the defendant intended to cause the 
entirety of the potential loss, if it were possible.  See id. (approving the use of the face 
value of worthless checks used in a “check kiting” scheme as the intended loss, despite 
acknowledging that a check kiter “will either abscond or be discovered before exhausting 
the kite”). 
The district court engaged in the “deeper analysis” required.  The district court 
cited Diallo and Geevers in announcing its intended loss finding and gave specific 
reasons for its conclusion.  Here, the district court found that had the defendants, as a 
practical matter, been able to charge each of the accounts to its limit before being 
detected, they would have done so.  The evidence shows that a majority of the cards were 
used multiple times unless or until they were declined.  For those cards that were not used 
until they were declined, the district court found based on other evidence that the 
defendants discontinued their use in order to avoid detection of the scheme by the 
retailers, financial institutions, or account holders.  This finding is consistent with the 
defendants’ rather extensive steps to conceal their use of the compromised accounts, such 
as traveling from the New York/New Jersey area to central Pennsylvania to make 
purchases, engaging in only a handful of transactions at each store, and switching 
registers.  The district court thus did not clearly err when it found that the defendants, had 
it been feasible, would have charged up to the credit limit on each account.  See id. 
 
7 
 
V. 
 For the reasons set forth, we will affirm. 
